Interaction Processes Between Key Actors – Understanding Implementation Processes of Legislation for Water Pollution Control, the Israeli Case by Sharon Hophmayer-Tokich
Selection of our books indexed in the Book Citation Index 
in Web of Science™ Core Collection (BKCI)
Interested in publishing with us? 
Contact book.department@intechopen.com
Numbers displayed above are based on latest data collected. 
For more information visit www.intechopen.com
Open access books available
Countries delivered to Contributors from top 500 universities
International  authors and editors
Our authors are among the
most cited scientists
Downloads
We are IntechOpen,
the world’s leading publisher of
Open Access books
Built by scientists, for scientists
12.2%
122,000 135M
TOP 1%154
4,800
2  
Interaction Processes Between Key Actors – 
Understanding Implementation Processes  
of Legislation for Water Pollution  
Control, the Israeli Case  
Sharon Hophmayer-Tokich 
The Twente Centre for Studies in Technology and Sustainable Development (CSTM) 
University of Twente 
The Netherlands 
1. Introduction  
Israel is a semi-arid water-scarce country with currently ca. 250 cubic meters per capita per 
annum. With limited natural water sources due to the country’s climate, geography and 
hydrology, it now faces its worst water crisis following several multi-year cycles of droughts 
(Israeli Ministry of Environmental Protection, n.d.). While these consecutive droughts 
aggravated the water-scarcity situation, it is by far not the main factor in the current crisis. 
In 2001 a parliamentary enquiry committee was established to investigate the water crisis. In 
its report the committee concludes that the crisis is mainly the result of inadequate 
management of the water sources throughout the years rather than the country’s natural 
conditions. Focused on rapid development, the water sources were managed mainly for 
quantity and over-exploitation was the main answer to the growing water demand, 
depleting the country’s water sources (Israeli Parliament, 2002). This created a major water 
deficit currently in an amount that is equal to the annual consumption of the country (Israeli 
Ministry of Environmental Protection, n.d.). The Committee’s conclusions are not a new 
revelation. In fact this was reported in numerous experts’ and State Comptroller reports in 
the past, though to no avail (Israeli Parliament, 2002; Adam, 2000). 
In light of the natural water scarcity and the ever-growing demand for water, one would 
have expected that the quality of the water sources is well protected. However, in addition 
to the long-term over-exploitation, on-going uncontrolled pollution further deteriorated the 
water sources and their quality (Adam, 2000; Laster & Livney, 2009), with the main source 
of pollution being untreated or partially treated wastewater.    
Whereas most of the population has received adequate sewerage facilities – removing 
wastewater from the population centers from early stages, wastewater treatment facilities 
lagged behind. In 1971 only 37% of the generated wastewater was treated, mostly by 
primary treatment, and in 1982 only 55%. By the end of the 1980s over 20% of the 
wastewater generated was discharged untreated into the environment, mainly to the 
adjacent dry river-beds, whereas the rest was mostly insufficiently treated resulting in low-
quality effluent (The State Comptroller, 1991). The country’s streams became in fact conduits 
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of wastewater (Gasith & Pargament, 1998), contributing to pollution of the surface and 
groundwater resources.  
Prevention of water pollution by wastewater receives, however, much attention during the 
1990s, and a new trend can be seen in which most municipalities begin engaging in building 
advanced wastewater treatment plants (Gabbay, 2002). By 2008, for example, ca. 92% of the 
generated wastewater was treated, of which 55% to secondary level and additional 32% to 
tertiary level. While further improvement is yet to be made with the remaining 8% being 
untreated (Israeli Ministry of Environmental Protection, n.d.), this is, no doubt, a substantial 
improvement in comparison to previous decades.  
The on-going water pollution was not the result of lack of legal tools. On the contrary, Israel 
has extensive legislations sufficient to protect its water sources and prevent their pollution. 
These were put in place at early stages of the State. It was their lack of enforcement that 
resulted in continuous pollution (Adam, 2000). Accordingly, while several factors can 
explain the shift observed starting the 1990s, forceful enforcement of the existing laws for 
the first time, is a crucial one (Hophmayer-Tokich, 2010). The question arises, why in 
previous decades were the laws not enforced, whereas starting the 1990s, they were? Laster 
(1976), addressed this issue in his doctoral dissertation, but at that point in time could refer 
only to the phase of lack of implementation. He referred to the institutional structure and 
particularly to the Ministry of Agriculture’s vast authority over water management. Adam 
(2000) concludes that in addition to the governmental institutional failure, public 
indifference to the on-going pollution, also explains well the lack of implementation.  
This chapter builds up on these previous works to further answer the question from actor-
centered approach. A study of the historical development of wastewater resource regime in 
Israel reveals that, among other things, the relevant actors in the policy network and the 
power-imbalance between them explain well the long-term neglect as well as the paradigm 
shift (Hophmayer-Tokich, 2010). In this chapter this is further explored with the aim to 
analyze the interaction processes between the relevant actors in the policy network as 
explaining mechanism for implementation processes. This is done using the Contextual 
Interaction Theory. The analysis addresses implementation processes of water sources 
pollution control legislation, with focus on domestic wastewater treatment – the main 
source of pollution. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework used for the purpose of this 
analysis; in Section 3 the relevant legislative framework for pollution control in Israel is 
presented and the interaction processes between key actors are analyzed; conclusions are 
drawn in section 4. 
2. Theoretical framework and methodology 
Laws and regulations are policy instruments, one of the traditional elements of public policy 
(Kissling- Näf & Kuks, 2004). As all other instruments, they are meant to reach policy goals 
(Linder & Peters, 1989). However, the actual outcome of a given policy does not always 
match the policy goals (Owens, 2008), as in practice implementation of policy instruments 
may be hindered or lacking. Thus, a distinction should be made between ‘policy formation’ 
and ‘policy implementation’ processes, and when looking at possible changes intended by a 
given policy, one needs to analyze the implementation of the policy instruments. This has, 
thus, been given a separate attention in policy studies. ‘Implementation’ in this context is 
seen as “processes that concern the application of relevant policy instruments” (Bressers, 
2004: 284). Since implementation of policy instruments is usually the responsibility of 
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relevant actors in the policy network, its processes can be seen as a social interaction 
between these key-actors (Bressers & Lulofs, 2010). This led to the development of the 
Contextual Interaction Theory.        
The Contextual Interaction Theory (in its latest conceptualization/adaptations based on 
Bressers, 2004 and Bressers & Lulofs, 2010) focuses on policy implementation and perceives 
policy processes (including policy implementation) as actor-interaction processes, meaning, 
processes that are influenced by activities and interactions of the relevant actors. Actors are 
individuals, representing themselves or their organizations, and within the context of 
implementation process include the responsible government officials (“implementers”) and 
the target group of the policy. The Theory’s basic assumption is that the characteristics of 
the actors involved, particularly their motivation, information, and power – are crucial in 
understanding courses and outcomes of policy processes (Bressers, 2004). This is based on 
the acknowledgement that for the accomplishment of any given task one needs a motivating 
objective, expertise, and capacity/resources (Owens, 2008). Motivation can incorporate both 
internal/own goals (values, self-interests) as well as external factors (such as those from 
higher authorities). It can also be influenced by self-effectiveness assessment. According to 
this concept an actor can become de-motivated if he perceives his preferred course of action 
to be beyond his capacity (de Boer & Bressers, 2011). Information incorporates issues such as 
interpretation, frames of reference as well as knowledge and accessibility to information 
required for execution of the task. Power incorporates available resources and 
control/authority (Bressers & Lulofs, 2010). Owens (2008) analyzed implementation 
literature reflecting important implementation variables, and found that in dozens of them 
the important implementation variables can be directly linked to the characteristics of 
motivation, information and power thus validating these characteristics as suitable.  
According to the Contextual Interaction Theory these characteristics and the interaction 
between them influence the standpoint of a given actor regarding the policy in question and 
in turn his position and activities within the interaction process with other actors in the 
policy network. The characteristics of the actors are also influenced by external contexts 
such as the specific context of the policy (former decisions, specific circumstances), the 
structural context of the governance regime, and the wider context (such as political, 
economic, cultural and others). The interaction between the key characteristics and between 
the actors in the policy process can also change over time (Bressers & Lulofs, 2010).       
The theory further assumes that policy implementation includes not only achieving 
implementation but also avoiding implementation. Interaction types may include: 
cooperation, either active (when actors have joint ambition), passive (e.g. when one actor  
is impartial about this implementation) or forced (when passive cooperation is imposed by  
a forceful and dominant actor); opposition, when one actor attempts to prevent 
implementation by other actors; and joint learning when only insufficient information 
prevents implementation (Bressers, 2004; Owens, 2008). The theory also distinguishes 
between two situations: lack of (or insufficient) implementation and failed/inadequate 
implementation (‘adequate’ with respect to the specific policy goals) (Bressers, 2004).  
As such, the theory is suitable for actor-centered analysis such as the one carried out in  
this chapter.   
To summarize, the characteristics of motivation, information and power of each actor and 
the dynamics between them influence the interaction process between the relevant actors 
(implementers and target group), which in turn influence the output and outcome of the 
policy process. Based on this, the Israeli case is analyzed. In this case the Theory is also used 
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to analyze the dynamics between the key characteristics and actors as explaining changes in 
the process over time (e.g. the shift from lack of enforcement and continuous pollution to 
forceful enforcement and pollution control). The analysis includes the actors; the 
interactions between them; and the outcome as a result.  
2.1 Methodology 
The findings presented in this chapter are based on a doctoral research and thus form a part 
of a larger study. The data collection includes documents’ review and analysis as well as in-
debt semi-structured interviews. The former includes review and analysis of relevant 
documents such as correspondences between position holders within relevant Ministries 
and other actors, minutes of meetings, relevant legislation, etc., using the State Archive, 
relevant reports and literature.  The latter includes interviews with relevant stakeholders 
such as Government officials from all Ministries and organizations involved, environmental 
Non-Governmental Organizations, experts from the academy, and private consultants, since 
the establishment of the State. This is found suitable for the qualitative approach used in the 
research. At points, the author relies on dated literature sources. This is due to the historical 
perspective and is used for the purpose of the analysis. 
3. Water pollution control and its implementation, the Israeli case 
In this section the relevant legislation is presented, following which the relevant actors and 
the interaction between them are analyzed as to explain the implementation processes of the 
pollution control legislation. It should be noted that the relevant legal system and policy-
network are highly complex, and only the most relevant laws / regulations and actors 
related to domestic wastewater are presented and discussed. 
3.1 Relevant legislative framework 
As above-mentioned, Israel has extensive legislations that can ensure the protection of its 
water sources (Adam, 2000). In fact, according to Laster (2000: 437), “in its early years Israel 
promulgated some of the most forward looking legislation in the world concerning 
protection of water sources”.  
The two most relevant and direct laws regarding freshwater pollution prevention and 
(domestic) wastewater treatment are: the Water Law (1959) and the Local Authorities 
(Sewerage) Law (1962). Two additional laws that should be mentioned include the Public 
Health Ordinance (1940) and the Streams and Springs Authorities Law (1965).  
The Water Law, promulgated in 1959, establishes the framework for the control and 
protection of Israel's water resources. It is the principle law regulating freshwater sources in 
Israel and is regarded by Laster (2000: 441) as “a brilliant legislative code to protect all 
aspects of Israel’s water and the recipe for its proper management”.  The Law defines the 
water sources (natural or man-made, including wastewater), and their ownership (public 
property, subject to the control of the State) as well as creates Israel’s water institutions. It 
creates the Water Commission (later on: Water Authority) and the position of the Water 
Commissioner (later on: the Director of the Water Authority) as the higher authority with 
respect to water management, giving him vast authority to manage the water affairs of the 
State (Laster, 2000; Laster & Livney, 2009). Significant sections of the Law deal with 
pollution prevention and control of all water sources. In 1971, the law was amended to 
include prohibitions against direct or indirect water pollution, regardless of the state of the 
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water beforehand. This amendment empowers the responsible Minister (initially the 
Minister of Agriculture) to set water quality standards for all sources and to promulgate 
regulations to prevent water pollution (Gasith & Pargament, 1998; Katin, 1976). The Water 
Commissioner further receives sanctioning power over polluters. For example, the power to 
require any person polluting water source to repair the situation within a reasonable 
amount of time and at the expense of the polluter (art. 11). Specific to wastewater pollution, 
the Law authorizes the Water Commissioner to order any polluter to provide him with a 
disposal plan. Failure to submit a plan or deviate from the plan can result in fine and loss of 
water supply, except for drinking purposes. The Water Commissioner can also bring 
criminal charges against a polluter – e.g. a mayor (Laster & Livney, 2009; Katin, 1976).  
The Local Authorities (Sewerage) Law was promulgated in 1962 to enable local 
municipalities to construct sewerage works. The Law prescribes the rights and duties of 
local authorities in the design, construction and maintenance of sewage systems (Israeli 
Ministry of Environmental Protection, n.d.). According to the Law a local authority may 
(and upon the demand of the Minister of Interior, must) install a sewerage system within its 
boundaries (Local Authorities (Sewerage) Law, 1962). The Law requires each local authority 
to maintain its sewage system in proper condition to the satisfaction of the health authority 
(Israeli Ministry of Environmental Protection, n.d.). Initially, the Law addressed the 
sewerage systems only; in 1972 it was amended to include also the construction of 
wastewater treatment plants.     
The Public Health Ordinance (1940), based on its amendment of 1970, provides the Ministry 
of Health a framework for the protection of the quality of drinking water including at the 
water source. Later amendments further prohibit any activities that cause environmental 
nuisances, including pollution by sewage (the Public Health Ordinance, 1940). Several 
regulations under this Law were promulgated over the years including the 1981 regulations 
for ‘effluent intended for use in irrigation’, restricting irrigation with effluent in accordance 
with the treatment level and the type of crops. These regulations, however, did not specify 
the required effluent quality and were thus difficult to enforce. In 1992 regulations for 
effluent standards (base-line quality defining the permissible concentrations of organic 
matter and suspended solids) were promulgated by the Minister of Health. These are 
considered a milestone in wastewater treatment processes in Israel. In 2010 new regulations 
were promulgated by the Minister of Environmental Protection and the Minister of Health, 
to include stricter requirements for effluent quality. These regulations set much higher 
treatment levels in existing and future wastewater treatment plants than were previously in 
force, for unrestricted irrigation and discharge to rivers (Israeli Ministry of Environmental 
Protection, n.d.).   
The Streams and Springs Authorities Law, established in 1965, empowers the responsible 
Minister (initially the Ministers of Agriculture and Interior – dual control) (Gasith & 
Pargament, 1998) to establish an authority for a particular stream or part of a stream, spring, 
or other water source (Israeli Ministry of Environmental Protection, n.d.). Once created,  
a stream authority has the power to abate sanitary hazards and prevent pollution of  
the stream.   
3.2 Actors in the policy network 
Several actors can be mentioned with respect to implementation of the relevant legislation: 
implementers of the policy, actors not directly participating in the process but facilitating 
and providing support to other actors, and the target group of the policy. Within the context 
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of this analysis actors are meant as organizations or individuals representing their 
organizations.  
The Water Commissionaire is the highest authority regarding management of the water 
sources including prevention of their pollution (until the transfer of the responsibility for 
prevention of water pollution to the Ministry of Environmental Protection upon its 
establishment in 1989). The Water Commissionaire, however, was – until 1996 – 
subordinated to the Ministry of Agriculture, appointed by and answers to the Minister of 
Agriculture. Furthermore, all but two of the Water Commissionaires since the establishment 
of the State were clear representatives of the agricultural sector. The Water Commissionaire 
of 1977-1981 was appointed as the Director General of the Ministry of Agriculture in 1980 
and served as both positions for several months (Israeli Parliament, 2002). As such, and with 
regards to the analysis offered by this chapter regarding motivation, information and power 
of main actors, the Water Commissionaire and the Ministry of Agriculture are considered as 
one actor (until 1996).   
The Ministry of Agriculture was initially entrusted with the ministerial responsibilities over 
the Water Law and the Water Authority/Water Commissioner. As such, the Ministry of 
Agriculture had the highest authority and influence over the protection of water sources. In 
addition, it had a shared responsibility over the Streams and Springs Authorities Law and 
some influence via the Local Authorities (Sewerage) Law, as plans for the establishment of 
wastewater treatment plants require the approval of the Minister of Agriculture (art. 13).  It 
was also involved via the Public Health Ordinance: according to article 65 when establishing 
regulations regarding effluent use for irrigation or other economic activity the Ministry of 
Health is to consult with the Ministry of Agriculture. Therefore, this Ministry is one of the 
main implementers of the relevant legislations.  
The Ministry of Health was entrusted with the responsibility to protect the county’s 
drinking water and as such had various powers to control water pollution, mainly under 
Chapter 6 of the Public Health Ordinance (this was also transferred to the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection upon its establishment), defining sewage as “nuisance”. It also 
has the responsibility for the quality and use of effluent for irrigation (Adam, 2000). Via the 
Local Authorities (Sewerage) Law it is involved in approving sewerage works. As such, was 
also in a position to prevent water pollution.  
The Ministry of Interior, as the Ministry responsible for the municipal sector, was entrusted 
with the ministerial responsibility over the Local Authorities (Sewerage) Law and can 
demand that a local authority will construct a wastewater treatment plant (art. 2). In 
addition, together with the Ministry of Agriculture it initially had the responsibility over the 
Streams and Springs Authorities Law. The Ministry of Interior is also to be consulted with, 
according to the Public Health Ordinance, concerning issues with implications for the local 
authorities (art. 3a).  
The Ministry of Environmental Protection was established in 1989. Upon its establishment it 
assumed the responsibility - previously under other ministries, mainly the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Ministry of Health, for protecting the water sources and preventing their 
pollution. It now had the ministerial responsibility over the water pollution sections of  
the Water Law (art. A1 “prevention of water pollution”); the sections related to nuisances  
in the Public Health Ordinance, some responsibilities regarding wastewater treatment  
via the Local Authorities (Sewerage) Law and over the Streams and Springs Authorities 
Law. As such it became one of the main implementers of water pollution control in  
the following years.  
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The Ministry of Infrastructures was established in 1996 and received the jurisdiction over 
the Water Authority/Water Commissioner and the Administration for the Development of 
Sewage Infrastructures. By its establishment the link between water management and the 
agricultural sector was broken for the first time. 
The Treasury Ministry, while not being a formal implementer, had a facilitating role via 
budgets allocated for this purpose, as elaborated in the following. 
The Prime Minister’s Office during the Rabin Government (established in 1992) prioritized 
development of infrastructure, wastewater treatment included. This government promoted 
relevant organizational change, allocated high budgets, as well as provided financial 
incentives for municipalities to treat wastewater, as elaborated in the following. As such it 
had a strong supportive and facilitating role.  
As for the target group, since the chapter focuses on pollution from untreated domestic 
wastewater, and as the legal responsibility for wastewater collection, treatment and sanitary 
disposal is of the local authorities, the target group is defined as the municipalities / 
mayors.  
3.3 Interaction processes between key actors  
With respect to pollution of water sources by wastewater, two phases can be defined based 
on the enforcement of the relevant laws: 1) 1948 (the establishment of the State) until 1989; 
and 2) 1989 until the present. In the following, each actor’s motivation, information and 
power are analyzed to explain the interaction processes between the main implementers and 
the target group, which in turn can explain the implementation processes of the pollution 
control legislation.   
3.3.1 1948 until 1989 
This phase is characterized by lack of enforcement. Only five court cases were filed by the 
Ministry of Health during the 1960s of which three addressed pollution by domestic 
wastewater. These, as Adam (2000) notes, were all the work of one official and were a rare 
exception. The Water Law, with the vast authority it provides for pollution prevention, was 
never enforced and sanctions prescribed by it, such as bringing criminal charges against 
polluters, went unused (Laster & Livney, 2009). The Springs and Streams Authorities Law 
was not implemented until 1989 when a stream authority was created for the first time with 
the establishment of the Yarkon River Authority (Gasith & Pargament, 1998). Indeed, the 
grim condition of the water sources (especially the streams), spoke for itself. Since relevant 
legislation was in place, had there been enforcement, this would have not been the case.  
The main actor with this respect is the Ministry of Agriculture, as established above. 
Entrusted with the responsibility for the Water Law and with the sanctioning authority that 
the Law provides, as well as via its roles in other relevant legislations, it had vast authority 
and power to implement and enforce pollution control. With the Water Commission 
subordinated to it, it also had access to the relevant expertise as well as the information 
regarding the state of the water resources. It is, after all, the Water Commissionaire that was 
empowered to manage the State’s water resources and had the means to do so. But what 
about its motivation?  In the new State, agriculture was a very important economic sector 
but more than this, it became a national and political objective behind which stood the 
Zionistic ideologies of settling the land, the right to work own land in own country, etc. As 
such, the Ministry of Agriculture enjoyed vast political support across the political 
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spectrum. It is against this background, that management of the water sources was 
entrusted to this Ministry. The Ministry of Agriculture, in fact, became the most important 
actor with respect to water management (with responsibilities also over other important 
water legislations such as the Water Drilling Law, 1955, and the Water Metering Law, 1955) 
and according to the parliamentary enquiry committee, managed the water sources 
exclusively and almost nothing could have been changed in water management without its 
cooperation (Israeli Parliament, 2002).   
This Ministry’s prime interest and goal, however, is to promote the agricultural sector and 
production, not to preserve the water sources as such (Adam, 2000). In the semi-arid 
country, agriculture on large scale requires irrigation, and the agricultural sector is the 
largest water consumer with ca. 70% of the water allocation (Central Bureau of Statistics, 
2010) and as such utilization of water sources in support of agricultural production, 
outweighed other water management aspects (Laster & Livney, 2009). With a strong 
agricultural lobby, the Water Commissionaires were mostly affiliated with the agricultural 
sector, as above-mentioned, with preference to short term agricultural interests over long 
term water considerations (Adam, 2000). As wastewater is defined by the Water Law as a 
water source it was indeed perceived in this period by the Water Commissionaires primarily 
as an additional (cheap/free-of-cost) water resource to be utilized by farmers. The position 
of the Ministry of Agriculture was that wastewater - being first and foremost a water source 
for irrigation, should be managed and fall within the authority of the Water Commission 
thus the Ministry of Agriculture (State Archive, container GL2033/22, 6.1.54). To reduce 
costs involved and encourage farmers to utilize effluent, the Water Commission’s/ Ministry 
of Agriculture’s officials advocated a method which became known as ‘agro-sanitation’. 
According to this method low-cost and low-tech facilities for primary treatment such as 
oxidation ponds and often only reservoirs, were constructed, following which the low-
quality effluent was to be utilized for irrigation with further natural treatment at the root of 
the plant and the soil (State Archive, containers G5117; GL2033/26; GL4647, various 
documents; Shtreit, personal communication, 24.7.01). This method, however, contributed 
heavily to the pollution of the water sources. Not only that it produced low quality effluent, 
but when not utilized for irrigation, surplus effluents were discharged into the nearest 
stream. The facilities themselves became a source of pollution as they were not properly 
maintained and upgraded. Furthermore, wastewater treatment for the purpose of 
pollution prevention was grossly neglected. Since budgets were limited, municipal plans 
for construction of treatment facilities that did not include concrete plans for effluent 
reuse for irrigation, were rejected and not funded despite continuous pollution to water 
sources or to the environment, for example, in the cases of the towns of Nahariya and 
Zichron Ya’aquov (Fleisher, personal communication, 15.5.01; Tal, personal 
communication, 14.5.01; State Archive, container GL2102 4/24(6), 11.4.67). All these 
resulted in steadily growing pollution. To conclude, the prime interest of the Ministry of 
Agriculture – the most influential actor, conflicted with the interests of preserving the 
water sources, and within this inner conflict of interest, the prime interests related to 
utilization of wastewater, prevailed. As such, this Ministry had vast power and 
information but no motivation to enforce pollution control laws.  
The Ministry of Health was another important actor via the sanitary aspect of wastewater 
treatment and its responsibility to protect drinking water and public health. The Ministry, 
however, had insufficient information, power (in practice) and motivation to enforce the 
laws. Regarding information, the Local Authorities (Sewerage) Law, for example, requires 
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that a municipality maintains its sewage system in proper condition ‘to the satisfaction of 
the health authority’. The Law, however, does not specify the type and amount of 
compliance required, nor does it specify which sanctions can be imposed, making its 
enforcement difficult. The Ministry of Health lacked also sufficient power to enforce the 
laws. Documents and correspondents’ analysis reveals an on-going dispute between the 
Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Health with respect to the authority related to 
wastewater management. The Ministry of Health, however, was smaller and weaker in 
comparison to the Ministry of Agriculture and in practice had little influence over the matter 
(State Archive, container GL2033/22, various documents). For example, in 1953 the Minister 
of Agriculture established the Sewage Committee—an inter-ministerial committee that 
would coordinate the different positions regarding wastewater solutions, and approve 
sewage plans. However, the Committee was to report to the Minister of Agriculture and out 
of eleven governmental members of the Committee six represented the Ministry of 
Agriculture (including the Chair) and only two the Ministry of Health, reflecting the power 
imbalance. Eventually, despite the different positions, the Ministry of Health approved the 
low-tech low-costs solutions that were advocated by the Committee, revealing passive 
cooperation. With respect to financial resources, the Ministry of Health had no own budgets 
for this topic (State Archive, container GL7345 2/13, September 1970). Finally, the Ministry 
of Health also lacked sufficient motivation. The Ministry of Health had other priorities to 
look after and within the Ministry, wastewater treatment received low priority. Pollution 
prevention and wastewater treatment were not considered a prime objective of this Ministry 
(Fliesher, personal communication, 15.5.01; Marinov, personal communication 23.5.01; 
Shelef, personal communication, 15.7.01). For example, the Public Health Ordinance allows 
the Minister to promulgate relevant regulations. However, the relevant regulations - 
‘effluent intended for use in irrigation’, were only promulgated in 1981. The regulations 
restrict effluent irrigation but with respect to protection of public health, not the water 
sources, and were promulgated only in relation to a cholera outbreak that occurred in 1970 
due to consumption of raw vegetables that were irrigated with untreated wastewater. The 
regulations allow irrigation with effluent based on permit system and for crops that are not 
meant for human consumption only, thus allowing irrigation of other crops. Moreover, the 
regulations did not specify the required effluent quality and merely prescribe that the 
dissolved oxygen concentration will be at least half a milligram per liter and that the effluent 
must not contain toxic compounds that may danger, in the view of the Director General of 
the Ministry of Health, the health of those that who come in contact with the effluent or with 
the irrigated crop (Gasith & Pargament, 1998). The fact that such regulations were 
promulgated at a relative late stage, do not address pollution of water sources and do not 
specify the required effluent quality, all reflect the lack of interest thus motivation to enforce 
water pollution control, by this Ministry. This lack of motivation can further explain the 
Ministry’s weaker position in the actor’s network and thus its passive cooperation.    
The Ministry of Interior has a central role in the enforcement of the Local Authorities 
(Sewerage) Law and as such could have been an important actor. Entrusted with the 
authority to order municipalities to install proper treatment facilities, this Ministry had the 
power to enforce the Law and protect the water sources from pollution. The Ministry of 
Interior lacked, however, sufficient information. While the Ministry was represented in 
inter-ministerial committees such as the Sewage Committee, in practice it was a marginal 
actor. It lacked the technical and professional expertise and accepted the position of the 
Water Commissionaire and the Ministry of Agriculture with respect to their approach to 
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wastewater treatment (Hecht, personal communication, 12.6.01). For example, following the 
cholera outbreak the government established a new inter-ministerial committee for 
wastewater management which was meant to define relevant policy, as well as the National 
Sewage Project – its operative arm, meant to execute this policy. The Director General of the 
Ministry of Interior was appointed as the formal Chair of the inter-ministerial committee 
based on the Ministry’s responsibility for the municipal sector and as wastewater treatment 
is an obligation of the municipalities. This, however, was a formal appointment only; the 
Director General admitted to have little information on the subject and in practice it was the 
Water Commissionaire that ran the committee (Kantor, personal communication, 8.5.01). It 
was the Water Commissionaire that also ran the operative arm and controlled the budgets. 
Most importantly, though, the Ministry of Interior lacked motivation. According to Adam 
(2000), the use of the authority given to it by the Local Authorities (Sewerage) Law would 
have prevented or reduced water pollution caused by discharge of untreated wastewater to 
the streams. However, she notes, the Ministry of Interior chose not to exercise this authority. 
Being the Ministry responsible for the municipal sector, the Ministry’s primal goal is to 
support the local authorities. The low-tech low-cost facilities that were advocated by the 
Ministry of Agriculture meant lower costs for the municipalities and with little interest and 
expertise in this topic, the Ministry of Interior accepted them as suitable solutions (Hecht, 
personal communication, 12.6.01). An example of the Ministry’s prime interest in the state of 
the municipalities rather than in wastewater treatment can be seen in the following. 
Following the cholera outbreak, the Israeli Government signed in 1972 an agreement with 
the World Bank concerning a loan for the purpose of upgrading wastewater treatment 
facilities. As per this agreement, the World Bank required, among other things, that the 
local authorities will ensure that the funds they raise with wastewater charges will be 
used for wastewater management, allowing them to repay the loan as well as maintain 
and operate the facilities. To comply, the Ministry of Interior issued an order by the 
General Director stating that local authorities are required to do so. This, however, was 
never enforced (Shtreit, personal communication, 24.7.01). In practice many of the local 
authorities used income from water and wastewater charges for other purposes, 
especially when in fiscal stress (Laster & Livney, 2009). Both the Ministry of Interior and 
the Treasury Ministry realized that enforcing this order would mean financial burden for 
the local authorities, and ignored it (Hecht, personal communication, 12.6.01). This, too, 
reveals that the Ministry of Interior’s prime interest was to support the local authorities 
and not to protect the water sources.  
An additional actor that should be mentioned is the Environmental Protection Service. The 
Service was established in 1973 as a department in the Prime Minister’s office following the 
Stockholm Declaration of 1972. In 1976 it was transferred to the Ministry of Interior, mainly 
in order to affect local authorities’ handling of sewage. The Environmental Protection 
Service, however, had mainly a research position and while it was represented in scientific 
forums, it had no decision-making power (Marinov, personal communication 23.5.01). As 
such it had the motivation and the information, but not the power. Nonetheless, it prepared 
the ground for the Ministry of the Environmental Protection that would be established at a 
much later stage.   
The Treasury Ministry has a facilitating role via budgets. However, prior to the agreement 
with the World Bank, separate national budgets were not allocated for wastewater 
treatment. The position of the Treasury Ministry was that the local authorities are expected 
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to finance sewerage works by themselves, and that the wastewater solutions should be the 
cheapest ones available (State Archive, container GL4647/746, 11.12.1961). Following the 
cholera outbreak and per the agreement with the World Bank, the Treasury Ministry was to 
provide 60% of the projects’ costs. With a clear interest to reduce costs, it followed the 
approach for low-cost facilities led by the Ministry of Agriculture.  
The target group is defined as the local authorities and their mayors, as they were given the 
formal responsibility for wastewater treatment and could be legally charged for pollution of 
the water sources. The municipalities had insufficient information to carry out this task. The 
Local Authorities (Sewerage) Law, as established above, did not specify the type and 
amount of compliance required, as long the health authorities were ‘satisfied’. In addition, 
most of the local authorities in these years were small and had little or no access to the 
required technical expertise (own personnel), and relied heavily on relevant central 
authorities such as the Sewage Committee. More importantly, they had insufficient 
resources. Prior to 1972 the government did not allocate separate budgets for wastewater 
treatment. Such funds became available after 1972 following the agreement with the World 
Bank, but these were assigned to the Central Government (the National Sewage Project, 
chaired by the Water Commissioner), which decided how to allocate the funds. 
Municipalities remained dependent on the central authorities to access these public funds. 
Raising private capital required the approval of the Treasury Ministry. This, however, was 
not considered appropriate during this phase. The only mayor at the time, trying to raise 
private capital, was the mayor of the coastal city of Haifa. Initiating the construction of a 
biological treatment plant during the 1950s, this mayor was a front-runner and ahead of his 
time. After establishing an inter-municipal cooperation and preparing the technical plans for 
the treatment plant, the final hurdle to overcome was the needed funds. The mayor, being 
extremely committed, managed to interest two French companies that would construct the 
plant with their own capital. In fact, a pioneer Build Operate Transfer (BOT) construction. 
The Treasury Minister, however, refused to approve this agreement, and only due to the 
mayor’s determination, this was eventually approved. The Haifa treatment plant went into 
operation in 1961, decades before other municipalities followed. Other less determined and 
less capable mayors – would have not succeeded (Hophmayer-Tokich, 2005). And finally, 
the local authorities had no motivation. Most of the municipalities had little or no inner 
motivation and focused on housing and economic development. Sewerage systems were 
constructed in early stages to remove hazards from the population centers thus any 
pollution that was caused by wastewater, was – in most cases, not felt by the inhabitants. In 
the cases that the inhabitants did experience the nuisances, such as the city of Tel Aviv via 
the Yarkon Stream or the city of Hadera via the Hadera Stream, mayors were more pressed 
to take action. External pressure, by higher authorities, e.g. by law enforcement – was 
completely non-existent. The central authorities reflected that the lack of action was 
tolerated. Therefore, the target group had little information, very few capacities (power) and 
hardly any motivation to comply with the Law and treat wastewater.  The main findings for 
this phase are presented in table 1.   
To conclude, several actors are given the authority to implement water pollution prevention, 
but none of them do so. Some actors lack access to power and information while others have, 
however none of them have the motivation. The main reason for that is that protection of 
water sources is not the primal goal of any of them. The Water Commissionaire at this phase 
has the formal task and authority to protect the water sources and prevent their pollution, 
thus given the power and the information. However, subordinated to the Ministry 
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Actors Motivation Information Power Interaction processes 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
Lacking; Primal goal – 
support agricultural 
production, not 
preserving the water 
sources. As such, 
advocated utilization of 
low quality (free of 
charge) effluent in 
support of agricultural 
production; 
No motivation to 
enforce wastewater 
treatment. 
Via the Water 
Commission 
subordinated to it -
has the expertise as 
well as the 
information 
regarding the state 
of the water 
resources 
Authority/sanctioning 
(enforcement) 
resources as well as 
sufficient financial and 
personnel resources; 
Level of general 
political support – 
very high 
Most powerful actor; 
However its power 
allows this Ministry to 
choose not to 
implement the Water 
Law or to implement 
according to own 
goals. This actor 
dominated the policy 
network based on its 
own goals and the 
wastewater 
management 
approach it advocated 
Ministry of 
Health 
Lacking; Pollution 
prevention and 
wastewater treatment –
not primal objective, 
receives low priority 
within the Ministry 
Lacking; the 
Sewerage Law 
does not specify 
the type and 
amount of 
compliance 
required, making 
its enforcement 
difficult 
Lacking; insufficient 
enforcement 
resources; authority in 
practice; and financial 
resources aimed at 
wastewater treatment
Weak position in the 
actors network; little 
influence over the 
process due to passive 
cooperation 
Ministry of 
Interior 
Lacking; Primal goal –
support the local 
authorities. Enforcing 
the Laws would have 
caused fiscal stress to 
the municipalities, 
which the Ministry of 
Interior was trying to 
avoid. Thus, no 
motivation to enforce 
wastewater treatment
Lacking: no 
expertise and 
technical know-
how 
Had the power via the 
Local Authorities 
(Sewerage) Law 
Impartial actor (by 
choice); little influence 
over the process 
Environment
al Protection 
Service 
High interest in 
protecting water 
sources 
Has access to 
sufficient 
information via its 
experts and 
scientists 
Has no power over the 
decision making or 
implementation 
processes 
Marginal actor in the 
policy network 
Target 
group: 
Municipal-
ities / 
mayors 
Low motivation to treat 
wastewater: little inner 
motivation, no external 
pressures, low self-
effectiveness 
assessment
No specification of 
type and amount 
of compliance 
required (by the 
Sewerage Law) 
limited personnel
Very limited financial 
resources (no direct 
access to public nor 
private capital) 
Weak position in the 
actors network; little 
influence over the 
process 
Table 1. Characteristics and interaction processes, key actors; 1948- 1989  
(lack of implementation) 
of Agriculture and appointed as a representative of the agricultural sector, lacks the 
motivation to enforce the Law. The Ministry of Agriculture’s prime values and interests are 
to promote agriculture, and securing water for irrigation is a high priority. Implementation 
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of pollution control instruments is not perceived as contributing to these goals. This 
Ministry is the most powerful actor in the policy network and in fact used its access to 
power and information to dominant the process for its own interests. Within the interaction 
process, this Ministry was not keen on sharing the vast powers it possessed over the 
management of the water sources. According to Laster and Livney (2009), for example, 
Stream Authorities were not established as the Water Commissioner did not intend to share 
his power with another authority and the Minister of Agriculture supported this position. 
All this reflect the influence of this Ministry over the implementation process. Other actors 
with some responsibilities and authority could have improved the state of affairs, but would 
or could not do so. They lack the motivation, information, and power in various degrees and 
with the Ministry of Agriculture being the most powerful actor, consciously allow it to take 
the lead as wastewater treatment is not a primal goal of any of them. Most of them, 
especially the Ministry of Interior and the Treasury Ministry, accept the approached 
advocated by the Ministry of Agriculture as it suits their own interests, and the only actor 
that shows some attempts to object – the Ministry of Health, has a weaker position in the 
interaction process and eventually passively cooperates with the Ministry of Agricultures’ 
approach. The target group lacks information and power, and with no access to funds was 
highly dependent on central authorities. Municipalities also lack motivation due to low 
internal motivation and lack of external pressure. Furthermore, mayors’ lack of motivation 
can also be explained by the self-effectiveness assessment concept. With little influence over 
the process and its outcomes, even mayors that may have preferred to take action, such as in 
the cases of Nahariya and Zichron Ya’aquov, realized they have no capacity to take such 
actions and became de-motivated. The above-mentioned mayor of Haifa is a rare exception.   
As a result, the implementation process can be defined as avoiding/lack of implementation 
due to passive cooperation. Most of the actors were impartial and passively cooperated  
with the standpoint of the more dominant actor – the Ministry of Agriculture, by not 
hindering nor stimulating the implementation of the Laws. As such, have little influence 
over the interaction process and thus on the policy outcome. The target group – is also in  
a weak position in the interaction between the actors and has little influence over the 
process as well.   
3.3.2 1989 until the present 
Starting 1989 a new trend of enforcement of relevant legislation can be seen. In response, 
most of the municipalities throughout the country, including ones that have neglected 
wastewater treatment for decades such as the city of Jerusalem, Be’er Sheva, Karmiel and 
others, began constructing highly advanced wastewater treatment plants. Several factors can 
explain this, of which the establishment of the Ministry of Environmental Protection is the 
most important one. 
The Ministry of Environmental Protection was established in 1989 as a small Ministry, 
meant to provide a solution for a coalition crisis. It soon after, however, became a crucial 
actor in pollution control enforcement. As above mentioned, it assumed the responsibility 
for protecting the water sources and preventing their pollution from other Ministries. As 
such, it has the power to enforce relevant laws. It also has the relevant information. 
Although the Ministry started as a small low-budgeted Ministry, it was staffed by highly 
trained team of professionals, also based on the Environmental Protection Service which 
prepared the ground and provided the newly established Ministry with the professional 
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expertise needed for the new tasks. Therefore the Ministry had access to power and 
information. These, however, were proven in the previous phase to be insufficient in the 
absence of motivation. More importantly, thus, the establishment of this new Ministry 
created for the first time an institution with an exclusive mandate to and interest in 
protecting the environment and the water sources (Adam, 2000). Furthermore, the 
Ministry’s personnel and especially its first General Director were fully committed to create 
a change, and the first Ministers were environmentally-oriented and supported the 
development of relevant strategies and policies (Adam, personal communication, 6.9.01). As 
such this Ministry had clear motivation to enforce the laws. Its immediate actions with this 
respect, clearly reveal that. 
Acknowledging that previously enforcement was non-existent, the Ministry’s first action was 
to begin developing a comprehensive policy of forceful enforcement and the enforcement 
mechanism. As municipal wastewater was the main source of pollution the Ministry turned to 
establish a policy against polluting local authorities. The main Law this policy could have been 
built on was the Water Law (art. A1). The maximum penalty for water pollution according to 
this Article, however, was very low: only 4,500 NIS*, with no provisions for imprisonment. 
These sanctions were insufficient to deter polluting local authorities. The Ministry’s first action 
was to amend the Law to allow more meaningful penalties. The amendment was completed in 
1991, following which any polluter could have been penalized with one year imprisonment or 
a fine of 150,000 NIS, and in case of continued violation of the Law - seven days of 
imprisonment and additional fine of 10,000 NIS for every day of continuous pollution after a 
written warning was issued†. Furthermore, the amendment to the Water Law included also a 
provision for citizen suits, allowing an additional route for enforcement. In parallel the 
Ministry’s officials started issuing warning letters to mayors demanding that they take actions 
to prevent pollution (Adam, personal communication, 6.9.01; Adam, 2000). In many cases the 
warning letters were sufficient, but in others lawsuits were filed. By 1995 fifty one lawsuits 
were filed by the Ministry of Environmental Protection against polluters, of which seventeen 
were against local authorities for violations of the Water Law (State Comptroller, 1996). 
Additional enforcement measure that was taken by the Ministry of Environmental Protection 
was an administrative measure of refusal to permit housing of newly built housing units 
unless the local authority in question had a proper wastewater treatment plant or advanced 
plans to construct one. In the beginning of the 1990s massive waves of immigrants from the 
former Soviet Union immigrated to Israel resulting in rapid development in most of the local 
authorities. At this point in time, taking such administrative enforcement measures put heavy 
pressure on mayors to treat wastewater (Marinov, personal communication, 23.5.01). In 
addition, the Ministry promulgated regulations on a wide range of issues related to water 
pollution (Adam, 2000), further enabling enforcement. The Ministry also promoted a policy 
towards stream rehabilitation. This includes establishing local administrations for stream 
restoration (30 such administrations were established by 2008) and regulating effluent 
discharge to streams. The latter – non-existent prior to the establishment of this Ministry, aims 
to enable base-line flow when potable water is unavailable, by permits system and by 
requiring stricter effluent quality when discharged to streams (Israeli Ministry of 
Environmental Protection, n.d.). 
                                                 
* Approximately $ 450 at the time (Adam, 2000) 
† In 2008 the Law was amended to further increase the fines to 350,000 and 23,000 for every day of 
continuous pollution.    
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The Ministry’s policy of enforcement, however, was not easily implemented and met 
objections from other Ministries, such as the Ministry of Housing. Furthermore, until 1993 
the Ministry of Environmental Protection did not have its own prosecutors and it relied on 
the Attorney General and the district attorneys to file lawsuits. These, however, were not 
keen on cooperating due to work load, low priority for environmental issues, and the 
availability of administrative measure of enforcement. Finally, bringing criminal charges 
against mayors can meet political objections and on occasions the Ministry’s staff was 
unable to file suits against a mayor. Determined to enforce the laws and promote a change, 
the Ministry’s officials turned to other solutions when needed, including transferring 
material to an environmental non-governmental organizatios so that it can file a civil law 
suit against the polluter, in case of political pressure against the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection taking such action. All these reveal that the newly established Ministry of 
Environmental Protection had a strong motivation to enforce water pollution control 
measures. This strong motivation enabled the Ministry’s officials to strengthen the power 
and information initially available to them by amendment of the Water Law to create a 
meaningful enforcement mechanism. Small and low-budgeted, and often facing political 
opponents and objections by other Ministries, the Ministry’s strong motivation to enforce 
the Law gave it a strong position in the policy network.                 
The Ministry of Health became a more meaningful actor in this phase. In 1992 the Ministry 
promulgated the base-line quality regulations for effluent standards. These regulations 
served as an important tool for enforcement as for the first time the local authorities could 
have been required to treat wastewater to meet clear standards. The new regulations 
compelled municipalities to establish advanced wastewater treatment plants in order to 
meet these standards. As such these regulations provided the Ministry of Health more 
access to power – with more authority at hand, and information with a clear frame of 
reference for enforcement. It should be noted that the regulations were co-initiated by the 
Ministry of Agriculture which by the end of the 1980s acknowledged for the first time the 
need to divert high quality effluent for non-restricted irrigation for the agricultural sector 
(Hophmayer-Tokich, 2010). In 2010 the regulations were amended by the Ministry of Health 
and the Ministry of Environmental Protection to include stricter standards. With respect to 
motivation, it seems that in this phase, the Ministry of Health has higher motivation to 
enforce the law. This can be explained by the drastic reduction in the power of the Ministry 
of Agriculture on one hand, and with the establishment of the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection on the other. By the end of the 1980s, in the fast growing market economy, 
agriculture lost both its ideological status and its economic significance. As such, the 
agricultural sector and the Ministry of Agriculture lost its political power. Regarding water 
management, with the transfer of the responsibility for water pollution control to the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection, and in 1996 with the transfer of the Water 
Commission (by then: Water Authority) to the newly established Ministry of Infrastructure, 
the Ministry of Agriculture lost most of its power over water management. This cleared the 
way for the Ministry of Health – traditionally a weaker opponent and passive cooperator of 
the Ministry of Agriculture with respect to wastewater treatment, to be in a stronger 
position to enforce the relevant laws. On the other hand, the establishment of the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection and the transfer of some of the Ministry of Health‘s authority over 
water pollution control and wastewater treatment to this Ministry, resulted in a new rivalry, 
this time between these two Ministries. It seems that this rivalry and the enforcement 
actions taken by the Ministry of Environmental Protection gave the Ministry of Health 
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additional motivation to enforce the laws and establish its position with this respect, as well 
(Tal, personal communication, 14.5.01; Balasha, personal communication, 14.5.01). As such, 
the Ministry of Health in this phase has better access to information and power, and higher 
motivation to enforce wastewater treatment.   
The Ministry of Agriculture, as abovementioned, lost most of its power, both in general and 
specific to water pollution control. In addition to the above-mentioned, in 1992 under the 
Rabin Government the Administration for the Development of Sewage Infrastructure was 
established to replace the previous inter-municipal Sewage Committee and its operative 
arm. In contrast to the past, whereby the Water Commissionaires were traditionally – 
officially or not - chairing the National Sewage Committee, the new Administration was 
subordinated to the Ministry of Interior and represented by different Ministries, excluding 
the Ministry of Agriculture (State Comptroller, 1996). Furthermore, its operative arm was 
headed by professional wastewater engineers with a clear affiliation to advanced 
technologies rather than to agricultural interests. The advocated technical solutions were 
now advanced treatment technologies (Gurion, personal communication, 16.07.01). All these 
resulted in loss of power by this Ministry in this phase. At the same time, an interesting 
development is that the Ministry of Agriculture – for the first time, shows more motivation 
for a higher effluent quality and high level treatment, from its own interests. By the end of 
the 1980s consecutive droughts resulted in major cut-downs in potable water allocation for 
irrigation. At the same time, the global price of cotton – previously a very lucrative crop, 
dropped drastically. This forced farmers to shift to more profitable crops, which require 
high quality effluent. These two resulted in high interest of the agricultural sector in a 
reliable alternative source of water for non-restricted irrigation – high quality effluent. This 
explains the co-initiation of the base-line effluent quality regulations. To conclude, at the 
start of this phase a shift in the Ministry’s motivation is observed, revealing higher 
motivation to treat wastewater to a high level, in combination with drastic reduction in 
power, thus much less influence over the enforcement process and lower position in the 
actors’ network.         
The Prime Minister’s Office should be mentioned with respect to Prime Minister Rabin. The 
Rabin Government, established in 1992, prioritized development of infrastructure in 
general, wastewater infrastructure included, in light of the massive waves of immigrants 
from the former Soviet Union. Apart from establishing the Sewage Administration, 
mentioned above, this government allocated substantially increased budgets for wastewater 
treatment plants. If prior to 1992 the annual budget for wastewater treatment was 15-20 
million NIS, this grew to 180 million NIS in 1993, 250 million NIS in 1994, 450 in 1995 etc. 
Moreover, in order to provide incentives for municipalities to engage in advanced 
wastewater treatment and apply for loans, partial grants up to 25%‡ of the overall loan 
became available for municipalities that submitted plans and received their approval within 
the first three years (Reich, personal communication, 14.06.01). This provided local authorities 
with higher motivation on one hand, and sufficient resources (power) on the other.     
With respect to the Ministry of Interior, its involvement in enforcement remains unchanged.  
The Ministry of Infrastructures was established in 1996 and received the jurisdiction over 
the Water Authority/Water Commissioner and the Administration for the Development of 
Sewage Infrastructures. This Ministry does not have power regarding enforcement of water 
                                                 
‡ 25% for municipalities applying for a loan in the first year, 20% second year, 15% third year (Riech, 
personal communication, 14.06.01).  
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pollution prevention legislation, but has a clear mandate and objective to upgrade the 
State’s infrastructure. Via the Sewage Administration it has control over the national 
budgets for wastewater treatment and has the professional staff to advice municipalities on 
that matter. As such it has a facilitating and supportive role.   
The target group in this phase is facing a different situation. In terms of motivation, it now 
has a very strong motivation to treat wastewater, mainly due to external pressure from 
enforcement authorities. Many mayors received warning notifications, were warned that a 
law suite would be filed against them, and in some cases indeed faced lawsuits. In parallel, 
in the midst of a massive building and development phase, were not allowed to populate 
the newly built neighborhoods unless they had an existing or planned proper wastewater 
treatment plants. Mayors realized that for the first time not treating wastewater is no longer 
tolerated by the relevant authorities. At the same time municipalities are given the resources 
and the means to comply with the law.  Regarding information, the municipalities now have 
clear standards to meet, thus have a frame of reference to what is asked of them. Most of the 
municipalities at this phase also have access to professional staff either via their own water 
departments, via inter-municipal cooperation, or private consultants. In any case, with the 
new Sewage Administration staffed with professionals not affiliated with the agricultural 
lobby, municipalities now have access to relevant information. And finally, municipalities 
now have access to financial resources, either in the form of loans from the government or 
by raising private capital which by the end of the 1990s was encouraged by the government 
and the Treasury Ministry. This gives municipalities more power in comparison to the 
previous phase, in which most of them were highly dependent on the central authorities. 
This can also be seen as influencing their self-effectiveness assessment, thus further 
motivating them.  
To conclude, several factors co-aligned to change the interaction process between actors and 
result in the paradigm shift: the establishment of the Ministry of Environmental Protection, 
the drastic reduction in the power and influence of the Ministry of Agriculture with – at the 
same time – its acknowledgement for the need to direct high quality effluent for irrigation, 
and the Rabin Government’s policy of investment in infrastructure. All these shifted the 
balance and altered the interaction between the relevant actors and resulted in the shift. 
With the establishment of the Ministry of Environmental Protection finally there was an 
institution that has access not only to power and information but also to motivation. With 
the sole interest in protecting the water sources, and with highly motivated staff to create a 
change, this Ministry started a new trend that could have not been overturned. In parallel, 
the drastic reduction in the power of the Ministry of Agriculture, that previously controlled 
almost exclusively the water management sector, including wastewater treatment, paved 
the way to a new interaction between the actors. With the new interaction, it can also be 
seen that the establishment of a Ministry that was determined to make a change and enforce 
the laws, influenced other relevant actors, previously with a weaker or impartial positions, 
especially the Ministry of Health, to embark on this trend and enforce the laws. Be it due to 
the new rivalry over authority, or due to actual interest in the needed change, the Ministry 
of Health became a relevant actor in the new trend of enforcement. Finally, enforcing the 
laws without providing the means to comply with the law would have made it very difficult 
for the municipalities to establish advanced wastewater treatment plants. The Rabin’s 
Government allocated high budgets and gave strong financial incentives for municipalities 
to embark on the new trend and invest in wastewater treatment; it also provided 
professional assistance and framework via the new Sewage Administration, now headed by 
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wastewater engineers rather than representatives of the agricultural sector. This process is 
still on-going and with the stricter regulations recently promulgated by the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection and Ministry of Health, and with the further amendment of the 
Water Law in 2008 to increase the penalties that can be imposed on water polluters, it seems 
that the high motivation to improve the state of the water sources, continues.     
As a result, in this phase the implementation process can be defined as achieving 
implementation. The interaction type, however, seems to not fully fit the types prescribed by 
the Theory. Since implementation is achieved, it can be described as cooperation as more 
actors share similar objectives. However, rivalry and power struggles hinder effective 
cooperation and coordination and it seems that the similar objectives are motivated by 
different reasons which result in more independent actions taken by different actors rather 
than active cooperation to achieve implementation. The Ministry of Environmental 
Protection’s interest is to protect the water sources; the Ministry of Health aligns either due 
to its wish to establish its authority within the new rivalry with the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection over control or due to its own interest in protecting the public 
health; the Ministry of Agriculture’s interest co-aligns as for the first time the agricultural 
sector acknowledges its need for high quality effluent for non-restricted irrigation as a 
reliable water source to replace potable water allocations for irrigation; the Prime Minister’s 
Office prioritize infrastructure to support the absorbent of massive immigration wave. All 
these influence the interaction process and aligned to result in different actors taking 
actions, based on their different motivations and own-interest, to enforce the law and 
promote advanced wastewater treatment. Although the process was not always smooth and 
faced objections such as by the Housing Ministry and although the challenges in this field 
are far from being resolved, the new interaction process yielded enforcement trend and 
positive results. The target group was now being pressured into compliance and at the same 
time assumed the power needed for the task. With more access to information and 
resources, municipalities are now in a stronger position in the interaction process to 
influence outcomes. The main findings for this phase are presented in table 2. 
 
Actors Motivation Information Power 
Interaction 
processes 
Ministry of 
Environmental 
Protection 
Clear ideology 
and unambiguous 
mandate to 
protect and 
preserve country’s 
water resources. 
The first 
independent 
organization with 
the sole interest of 
protecting the 
environment 
Highly trained and 
professional staff, 
experts and 
scientists, related to 
environmental as 
well as legal matters. 
The former 
Environmental 
Protection Service 
provided the needed 
base for the new 
Ministry 
The Ministry assumes 
responsibilities and 
authorities previously 
belonging to other 
ministries. Despite little 
financial resources, the 
Ministry makes the most 
out of its 
authority/sanctioning/
enforcement powers;  
soon after its 
establishment amends 
 the Water Law to  
provide a meaningful 
enforcement tool and take 
immediate enforcement 
actions 
Became a crucial 
actor in the policy 
network in terms of 
law enforcement 
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Ministry of 
Health 
Higher 
motivation in 
comparison to 
previous phase. 
Mostly, power 
struggle with the 
newly built 
Ministry of 
Environmental 
Protection as a 
motivation to 
become a more 
powerful actor 
The base-line quality 
regulations, 
promulgated by the 
Ministry of Health 
in 1992, gave a 
frame of reference 
for law enforcement
Increased: Enforcement 
resources and authority in 
practice (via e.g. the base-
line quality regulations); 
Still lacks own financial 
resources aimed at 
wastewater treatment 
Stronger position in 
the actors’ network 
especially with 
respect to law 
enforcement; more 
influence over the 
process; aligned 
with other actors to 
promote advance 
wastewater 
treatment 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
For the first time 
acknowledges the 
need to utilize 
high quality 
effluent in 
support of 
agricultural 
production due to 
several drought 
years and cut-
down in potable 
water allocation 
for agriculture, 
leading to co-
initiation of the 
base-line quality 
regulations 
With the 
government’s 
decision from 1992 
to establish the 
Sewage 
Administration, 
headed by 
professional 
wastewater 
engineers and with 
the transfer of the 
Water Authority to 
the newly 
established Ministry 
of Infrastructure in 
1996 lost its grip 
over the relevant 
information 
Level of general political 
support – very low; lost 
most of its powers in the 
new advance market-
based economy. With the 
transfer of the 
responsibility for water 
pollution control to the 
Ministry of Environmental 
Protection in 1989 and the 
Water Authority to the 
Ministry of Infrastructure 
in 1996, lost most of the 
relevant authority and 
financial resources 
Much reduced 
power; less 
influence over the 
process but aligned 
with other actors 
(from own goals) to 
promote advance 
wastewater 
treatment 
Ministry of 
Infrastructure 
Objectives: 
upgrade national 
infrastructures 
Received the 
jurisdiction over the 
Water Authority 
and the 
Administration for 
the Development of 
Sewage 
Infrastructures and 
as such has access to 
relevant information
Received the jurisdiction 
over the Water Authority 
and the Administration for 
the Development of 
Sewage Infrastructures 
and as such has relevant 
financial and personnel 
resources 
Interests aligned 
with other actors to 
promote advance 
wastewater 
treatment 
Target group: 
Municipalities
/mayors 
High motivation 
to treat 
wastewater 
mainly due to 
external pressures 
(law enforcement)
clear specification of 
type and amount of 
compliance required 
(by the base-line 
quality regulations); 
better access to 
technical know-how
Better access to financial 
resources (both public and 
private) 
Target group is 
pressured into 
compliance with the 
law on one hand 
and given access to 
resources for 
implementation on 
the other thus in a 
better position in the 
actors’ network 
 
Table 2. Characteristics and interaction processes, key actors; 1989-present (implementation) 
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4. Conclusions  
In the State of Israel wastewater treatment has been neglected for decades. Municipalities – 
legally responsible for wastewater collection, treatment, and sanitary disposal, established 
the collection systems to remove hazards from their population centers, but in most cases 
neglected the elements of treatment and sanitary disposal. Untreated or partially treated 
wastewater was discharged into the environment, mostly to the nearest stream or dry 
riverbed, resulting in on-going pollution of the scarce water sources. Advanced legislation 
was in place since early stages of the State, providing the sufficient legislative framework to 
protect and preserve the water sources but the laws were not enforced. The intended policy 
goals were thus not attained due to lack of implementation. Since the beginning of the 1990s 
a shift can be seen and most municipalities, including ones that have neglected wastewater 
treatment for decades, began establishing advanced treatment plants. This is mainly the 
result of forceful enforcement and the pressure put on municipalities and their mayors. 
While water pollution by wastewater is far from being resolved, there is - no doubt, a 
substantial improvement in comparison to the past. This chapter aims to analyze and 
explain the lack of implementation of the policy instruments – relevant legislation for 
pollution control, as well as the shift to its implementation.   
The implementation processes in the Israeli case are analyzed from actor-centered approach 
based on the Contextual Interaction Theory. This approach assumes that since 
implementation of policy instruments is the responsibility of relevant actors in the policy 
network, they can be seen as a social interaction between key-actors. The characteristics of 
the actors involved, particularly their motivation, information and power, are analyzed as to 
explain the standpoint and activities of each of the actors in the policy network.  These 
further explain the interactions between the key actors and in turn, the outcome with respect 
to the implementation process. Accordingly, the analysis offered in this chapter addresses 
the key actors in the implementation processes of pollution control legislation, their key 
characteristics, and the interaction between them.  
The Israeli case shows a shift from a phase of lack of implementation prior to 1989 to a phase 
of achieving implementation following 1989. It also reveals that the Contextual Interaction 
Theory can explain well these implementation processes. In the first phase relevant actors 
had access to information and power in various degrees but none of the actors with the 
power to enforce the law - had also the motivation to do so. The analysis shows that none of 
the actors has a primal interest in protecting the water sources by requiring municipalities to 
treat wastewater as all of them had other more important priorities to look after. As such, 
the most influential actor – the Ministry of Agriculture, dominated the policy network based 
on the lack of motivation and relative lack of power and information of other actors, and 
avoided implementation of water pollution control to serve its own primal interest –
utilizing wastewater for agricultural production. This Ministry advocated a low-cost low-
tech wastewater management approach that served the short term agricultural interests but 
not the long term water considerations. Other actors passively cooperated with this 
approach either because it served their own interests as well, e.g. in the case of the Ministry 
of Interior, or because they had a weaker position in the network to influence the outcome, 
e.g. the Ministry of Health and the target group. This influenced the outcome of the 
implementation process – insufficient wastewater treatment and on-going pollution. The 
interaction between the actors had changed starting 1989, most importantly due to the 
introduction of a new actor – the Ministry of Environmental Protection with a sole interest 
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and high motivation to protect the water sources, as well as with a change in the key 
characteristics of the Ministry of Agriculture, with less power and higher motivation to 
promote advanced treatment. Wider contexts such as the massive immigration from the 
former Soviet Union and the rapid development it brought with it further influenced the 
implementation processes. In this new interaction, the Ministry of Environmental Protection 
promoted forceful enforcement and other actors participated in this process, e.g. the 
Ministry of Health, or supported it, e.g. the Prime Minister’s Office, based on their own 
priorities. Putting pressure on the target group on one hand and providing it with means to 
comply on the other, gave municipalities motivation as well as information and power to 
comply. As a result, in this phase advanced wastewater treatment is achieved in many of the 
municipalities. Still facing many challenges, the enforcement trend continues.    
Several lessons can be learnt from the Israeli case. (i) enforcement processes are indeed actor 
interaction processes and the result of this interaction in terms of the policy outcome can be 
well explained, thus predicted, by understating actors’ access to motivation, information 
and power; (ii) key characteristics of the key actors can change over time and in turn result 
in changed outcome of the process; (iii) motivation seems to be the most important 
characteristic explaining implementation processes. Access to power and information alone 
were found to be insufficient as in the case of the Ministry of Agriculture. Furthermore, 
motivation can be used to create or increase access to better information and power as was 
the case with the Ministry of Environmental Protection. Understanding this, an intervention 
measure in cases of on-going pollution could be to create motivation either within the 
existing actors, e.g. the Ministry of Agriculture’s acknowledgement of the need for 
utilization of high quality effluent for non-restricted irrigation, or by creating a new actor 
with high motivation, as was the case with the establishment of the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection; (iv) in the absence of an actor with access to both motivation and 
power, establishing an actor with motivation and information can in the long run prove to 
be useful as in the case of the Environmental Protection Service. While this actor had no 
power to enforce the law, it prepared the ground for such enforcement using its motivation 
and information and once an relevant organization with access to power was established – the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection, it could immediately embark on the tasks ahead using 
the information available by the Service; (v) once there is an actor with motivation and actions 
are taken, others may follow even if just to maintain and justify their authority over the matter. 
Pollution by untreated wastewater is a major environmental problem in many countries 
worldwide. Understanding these processes and interactions between key actors may assist 
predicting outcomes of policy processes and allow deliberate interventions to influence the 
motivations, information and power of the key actors.  
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